Part III: Attack Continued and Conclusions:By this time some of the enemy had come up to within small arms range of G Company's left platoon where a firefight was taking place. At 0825 Col. K.S. Anderson, commanding officer, 324th Infantry, gave the following order to Lt. Col. Collin P. Williams, commanding officer 2nd Battalion, by telephone: "Williams, don't let them take E Company's outpost. I am attaching C Company to you. Use them as you need them. I will use the whole battalion (1st Battalion) if it is necessary to hold that outpost. Counterattack with all of F Company if necessary. Don't lose anything anywhere in your area."
 This statement shows the importance placed on the holding of this ground by higher headquarters. At 0907, another platoon from E Company, commanded by Lt. Charles E. Smith, was ordered to the outpost position. The platoon was caught in an enemy artillery barrage just as it left the woods and received seven casualties.
It was here that Lt. Smith gave a much-talked-of order. Lt. Smith saw that he had a number of casualties and some men shaken up rather badly; as he got to his feet he issued the following order: "All who are able, follow me." When the platoon reached the outpost everything was under control, but Lt. Barra and his men were glad to see them. By this time the Germans seemed to be discouraged, and at 1225 all was quiet.
During this attack the Germans fired the bulk of their artillery concentrations on L Company's positions, in the 3rd Battalion sector. This kept L Company under cover but allowed every one of the 2nd Battalion riflemen, who had a target, to bring his fire to bear on the counterattack. From prisoners of war we learned that the attack was launched by the 1st, 2nd, and 3rd Companies supported by tanks and artillery. However, no tanks were used against the 2nd Battalion; this was probably due to the accuracy of our artillery fire previously mentioned. We estimated that this battalion suffered 200 casualties, which was confirmed by prisoners-of-war reports, one of which stated that only 10 men remained in one of the companies after the attack.
This was the last try for the Germans. They evidently had all of the counterattacking they wanted and our new main line of resistance was secure.
Analysis and criticism:
 In studying this operation it is my opinion that the so called "school solution" was attained by all commanders, from the division to platoon. The opportunity to have time available, to gather enemy information, make detailed plans, issue adequate orders and discuss them at all levels of command is seldom available as it was in this operation. This alone tends to eliminate the confusion of battle and reduce the number of hasty decisions commanders are required to make.
Our patrols had sought the enemy out, located his positions, discovered his habits, his strength and the weak places in his line. This information, in conjunction with the detailed study of the terrain, made for sound and accurate tactical decisions.
Tactical surprise was complete and aggressively exploited. This is borne out by the rapidity by which the objective was seized and the fact that the enemy fired his protective fires, after an entire battalion had penetrated his lines, into an open field.
The willingness with which the troops carried out orders, aggressively and to the letter, is an indication of good discipline and high morale. Their complete knowledge of the tactical plans, no doubt, contributed immeasurably to this. The operation was executed exactly as planned.
 Alternate plans were prepared for all phases of the attack; however, it was not necessary to use any of them. Such plans increase confidence, and are added insurance for the accomplishment of a tactical mission.
The attack was coordinated and well-planned, which leads to smooth and rapid execution, lessening the possibilities of failure and casualties. This operation is an excellent example of the use of a double envelopment, and under the cover of darkness without artillery preparation. The use of such an operation on such a small objective requires adequate plans and coordination.
The decision of the regimental commander in calling upon the battalion commanders to submit plans for the attack, during the planning phase of the attack, is an indication of foresight on his part. This not only gave him the advantage of the knowledge of the commanders and their staffs, but created interest in the attack.
The E Company outpost platoon which repelled the counterattack on Feb. 17 by staying in their holes, using their weapons and rendering accurate reports is an indication of the fighting ability of a small determined group of riflemen. The accurate reports of the situation to higher headquarters enabled the supporting arms to be used efficiently and promptly.
Massed artillery fire can be used effectively against armor. During the enemy attack Feb. 17, 1945, no enemy armor appeared to our front, while it is definitely known that his plans called for the use of armor.
The division commander's foresight in using all three regiments in the attack to allow normal zones of action for the regiments, announcing it well in advance is an indication of an appreciation of the problems of subordinate commanders. This was a sound plan under the circumstances due to the knowledge of the capabilities of the enemy.
The F Company Platoon leader, who withdrew his platoon while a heavy blanket of fog limited the visibility to a few yards, showed a lack of appreciation of the fact that during periods of low visibility the tactical dispositions must be the same as at night. Had this platoon stayed in their night positions they could have supported the outpost platoon by fire and prevented the outpost from becoming surrounded. The enemy was also guilty of the same offense.
Had the German's sentinel and warning system been adequate, we would not have been permitted to so completely surprise and confuse him. This is an inexcusable error in any command.
The enemy had become habitual in the routing of occupying his defenses. These routine habits were a contributing factor to our scheme of maneuver which cost him dearly at a time that he could least afford losses.
The enemy had selected key terrain, organized it strongly against a frontal attack, but failed to show appreciation of the fact that an attack could come from the rear; consequently, he was totally unprepared for such an attack. This also indicated that he had underestimated our ability to launch such an attack, from the direction which we chose at that time. Lessons learned• Surprise must always be sought in a tactical operation and once obtained, be aggressively exploited.
• Detail plans and adequate orders are essential to eliminate confusion, save lives, and allow units to accomplish their mission.
• Active and aggressive patrolling is mandatory for units in the defense. The lack of such leads to disaster.
• When troops are thoroughly oriented on an operation, their morale will be high, their discipline good, and they will have confidence in their ability to accomplish the assigned mission.
• Commanders must always plan for future operations, regardless of what the present tactical situation is.
• During periods of low visibility, defending troops must occupy a tactical locality the same as they would during darkness.
• Defending troops must not become habitual in their actions, because an alert enemy will take advantage of these habits and use them to their advantage.
• A small group of riflemen, dug in, who appreciate the value of their weapons and are determined to fight, can hold ground against a much superior force.
• Alternate means of communication helps assure control, and is good insurance in any operation.
• The preparation of alternate plans, even though not used, eliminates hasty decisions and increases the chances for units to accomplish the mission. |
