Part II: The Battalion Plan of Attack
Our estimate of the enemy in front of the 2nd Battalion was that he held the Buchen Busch Woods with one rifle company, reinforced by many machine guns, some mortars and limited artillery support. That the edge of the woods was mined and positions were well-protected by tactical and protective wire. Enemy positions on the eastern and to the south of the Buchen Busch Woods were occupied during the night and vacated at least one hour prior to daylight. An enemy reserve was maintained in the vicinity of Eppingen-Urbach of unknown strength, which we estimated not to exceed one rifle battalion with some tanks and self-propelled guns.
In the 2nd Battalion we believed that we could gain the northern and eastern half of the Buchen Busch Woods by stealth just before dawn and attack to the south, thus hitting the enemy from the right rear. If such an attack were successful in surprising the enemy, we could accomplish our mission without entering the areas of his protective fires or breaching his mine fields. To accomplish this we believed that we could move forward just prior to daylight, after the enemy had withdrawn from his night positions, and attack the woods from the north.
The scheme of maneuver decided upon was to have E Company lead the attack with two platoons, one of which would seize and outpost the crossroads about 500 yards northeast of the woods, the other platoon was to seize the nose of the hill about 400 yards to the right of the crossroads. When these two platoons arrived on their respective objectives, they were to take up an all-around defensive position which would block the enemy movement of reserves from Utweiler, Eppingen-Urbach and Urbach.
In addition, these outposts would be in a position to prevent the escape of enemy from the Buchen Busch Woods. The remaining E Company platoon would constitute the battalion reserve and was to take up positions in the vicinity of Melingerhoff Farm to protect the base of fire. F Company, plus one section of H Company, Heavy Machine Guns, was to follow E Company closely to a position north of the eastern half of the Buchen Busch Woods, from which it would deploy to assault the woods from the northeast. G Company, plus one section of H Company Heavy Machine Guns, was to follow F Company closely, seize, organize and hold the nose east of the Buchen Busch Woods.
The base of fire, which regiment had prescribed, was to be organized on the high ground in the vicinity of the Melingerhoff Farm. The base of fire was to consist of Cannon Company, Anti-Tank Company, the remainder of H Company, D Company, the 36 tank destroyers and the .50-caliber machine guns of the regiment. The base of fire was divided into two parts, one to cover the eastern half and the other to cover the western half of the woods. Regiment also directed that two fire-control stations would be established commanded by the Heavy Weapons Company Commanders of the 2nd and 3rd Battalions, and that the Company Commander Anti-Tank Company would coordinate the fire between the two control stations to ensure safety to the advancing troops. If tactical surprise was not gained we would be forced to assault the enemy from the front and the base of fire could be called upon to pin him in his hole until the advancing troops could close with him.
The base of fire could also be used on the enemy strong point if surprise was gained, and the assaulting troops from the northeast were stopped by enemy defense to the rear of their position in the woods. This added to the flexibility of the plan of attack and allowed for alternate plans throughout the entire attack. Permission was requested from the 100th Infantry Division, on the right, to establish an observation post for the battalion, during the attack, which was granted. The battalion plan of attack closely followed orders and directives from regiment, and was readily approved by Col. Anderson.
The supporting engineers, the ammunition and pioneer platoon, and regimented mine platoon were to be used to move forward entrenching equipment, wire, and mines closely behind the attacking echelon, and to help the attacking troops prepare defensive positions on the new main line of resistance. As soon as higher headquarters approved the plan of attack for the 2nd Battalion, we were prepared to explain the plan in detail to everyone in the battalion. Aerial photos and maps were issued down to, and including, all platoons. Officers and enlisted men alike studied the terrain, and aerial photos. Everyone in the battalion seemed to know where he was to go and what to do. The enlisted men had complete confidence in the attack plan and it was not uncommon to hear them make boisterous remarks, among themselves, as to what they were going to do to the Krauts in front of them.
 This was a healthy situation as far as morale was concerned, but a source of headaches for the S-2s of the regiment. Two days prior to the attack the Frenchmen in the Regimental Area were well-informed about the attack, and it was not uncommon for them to ask the officers about it. However, the exact time of the attack was not known, and it was felt that tactical surprise could still be gained. On Feb. 14, 1945, Col. K.S. Anderson, the regimental commander, emphasized that the element of surprise might be lost, but changes in the plan of attack would not be made.
On Feb. 13, 1945, the 324th Infantry Regiment published Operations Instructions numbers 9, 10 and 11 to the 1st, 2nd and 3rd Battalions, respectively. These instructions outlined the importance of the detail plan, control, coordination between units, the aggressive execution of the attack, and alternate attack plans for all phases of the operation. The last paragraph of these instructions reads as follows: "When the enemy alarm is given, speed and vigorous execution of plan, is the most essential element to success, and only by rapid, aggressive movement can attack succeed with minimum casualties."
At about 1200 hours Feb. 14, 1945, we (2nd Battalion) received the order from regiment that we would attack at H minus 60 minutes, H hour 0645, Feb. 15, 1945. By this time all details of the attack had been planned, studied, and everyone completely oriented on both the primary and alternate plans of the operation.
Part Two: The attack
At 0530 Feb. 15, 1945, the 1st Battalion, 324th Infantry, the Regimental Reserve, was in position in the vicinity of Bettviller, and the attack was ready to jump off. At 0545, the 2nd Battalion crossed the line of departure in a column of companies, in a column of twos; E Company, less one platoon, leading, followed by F Company and G Company respectively. In order to clearly outline the actions of the companies for the reader, the actions of each company will be described separately.
Capt. Delbert O. Berry, commanding officer of E Company, led his company, less one platoon, with one section of H Company Heavy Machine Guns, through the enemy lines east of the Buchen Busch Woods, past the enemy strong point in the woods, unchallenged by enemy sentries. By 0630, E Company, less one platoon, was digging in on its objective. Staff Sgt. Al De Marco, of E Company, discovered and cut the enemy telephone lines at the crossroads northeast of the woods upon his arrival at the platoon objective. It is needless to say that this, no doubt, added confusion to the enemy's already confused situation.
Capt. William H. Applegate, commanding officer, Company F, followed closely behind E Company, with F Company, to a previously designated assembly area northeast of the Buchen Busch Woods, and was prepared to assault the eastern half of the woods at 0639. F Company, while moving into position to deploy for the assault, ran into one enemy sentry who fled without firing a shot or sounding an alarm. At daylight 0645, F Company, with the 1st and 2nd Platoons abreast, followed by the 34th Platoon, with the Light Machine Gun section between the 1st and 2nd Platoons, attacked the enemy position from the right rear with marching fire. The suddenness of this attack and the volume of small arms fire pinned the enemy in their holes which made them easy targets for hand grenades and bayonets.
Lt. Richard Shattuck, F Company executive officer, who attacked with the 1st Platoon, made the following statement: "We moved into the northeast edge of the woods using marching fire. The Kraut was stunned with the force of the assault. We were scared but kept moving in. There were positions all through the woods including several covered machine gun positions. Those who did not surrender withdrew to the southern edge of the woods. There they ran into their own wire and mines. By the time we reached the edge (southern) of the woods, we were out of ammunition as we had covered everything with fire. The last group we ran into was in a bunker (machine gun position) at the extreme edge of the woods. We went after them with bayonets -- I had my knife. After I worked one over, the rest surrendered. Bradshaw (Lt. George B. Bradshaw, F Company Weapons Platoon leader) got a few, too. By 0820, it was all over."The enemy whom Lt. Shattuck worked over with his knife had his throat cut from ear to ear. F Company could now move to, prepare, and occupy positions on the main line of resistance.
In order to keep the events of the attack clear for the reader, it is necessary to look in on the 3rd Battalion who had the responsibility of clearing the western half of the woods. L Company, the assault company in that sector, was equally as successful as F Company, but was slightly behind F Company which was not a part of the plan, but added enemy dead to the operation. Some of the enemy were trying to withdraw to the west to get away from F Company which allowed L Company to catch them in the open with their fire.
 G Company, commanded by Capt. Carl Clardy, followed E Company closely through the enemy lines, killed an enemy sentry to their front and occupied their assigned objective to protect the right flank and rear of the battalion.
By 0820, the 2nd Battalion had accomplished its mission and was rapidly digging in on the new main line of resistance. Engineer dumps of antitank mines and wire had already been established, and the battalion was rapidly preparing for the enemy counterattack which was sure to come. The tactical surprise was so complete that at 0639 the enemy fired his protective fires south of the Buchen Busch Woods into the empty field.
The results of this attack for the battalion were as follows: wounded in action, 17; missing in action, 1; killed in action, 0; meanwhile, the enemy suffered 40 killed in action; 60 prisoners of war, and the loss of a large number of arms and equipment. It was discovered that the southern edge of the woods was heavily mined, and 55 automatic weapons were taken from the eastern and southern edge of the woods. This indicates that our patrols had been accurate and substantiates our belief that a frontal attack would have been a costly one.
The Counterattacks
At 0710 a small counterattack developed from the direction of Eppingen-Urbach against the E Company outpost at the crossroads which they contained with mortar support and by 0740 had been broken up.At 0800 Lieutenant Colonel Collin F. Williams, commanding officer, 2nd Battalion, inspected the positions on the new main line of resistance and coordinated the tie-in with the 100th Division on the right flank and the 3rd Battalion on the left. Throughout the day positions were improved, counterattack plans prepared to eject enemy in case of penetration, and plans were made to install double apron wire to our front that night. At 1900, a battalion observation post was established in the E Company outpost position at the crossroad.
At 0215, Feb. 16, 1945, the enemy opened up with artillery preparations on our new positions, at 0320, an estimated 75 enemy attacked from the north astride the north-south road through E Company outpost. The attack was smothered with artillery and mortar fire and was dispersed before reaching our battle position.
The enemy continued to harass us with artillery fire through Feb. 16. During the late afternoon of Feb. 15-16, 1945, we observed the enemy preparing positions on the hill to our front. Our outposts reported considerable vehicle traffic in Eppingen-Urbach during the night of Feb. 16-17, and tank movement in the southwest edge of the town was reported at 0445. We requested artillery fire on the estimated location of the tanks, and the artillery boys laid it on. The effectiveness of the artillery fire on the tanks is borne out by an entry in the regimental IPW report of Feb. 16-17, in which a prisoner of war stated that between 0500 and 0600, Feb. 17 he saw our artillery hit several of their tanks and that he personally saw one burning.
At 0750, Feb. 17 the enemy attacked in a heavy fog in force. A platoon from F Company that occupied night positions to the left rear of the E Company outpost had withdrawn to their day positions. At 0805 Lt. Rollin J. Barra, platoon leader of E Company's 3rd Platoon, and his man were surrounded in the E Company outpost at the crossroads. This outpost consisted of a group mutually supporting foxholes, without overhead covers, linked into an all-around defensive position with a double-apron barbed-wire fence to their rear. The attack was on the outpost before they knew it due to the limited visibility in the dense fog, but the platoon opened up with all the firepower they had. Lt. Barra called for artillery and mortar fire and made a very accurate report to battalion headquarters as to just what was going on. Lt. Barra then started bringing the 81 and 60 mortar fires in closer to their positions until some of the rounds were falling as close as 10 yards. Our artillery was pounding the Germans to the right and left and deep in front of the outpost positions. |
